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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE JACKSON and MILDR.ED 
JACKSON, his \vife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
H. T. COPE and T. TRUMAN COPE, 
Co-partners, doing business under 
the firm name and style of Cope 
Brothers Lumber Co., 
Defendants a.nd Appellants. 
c·ase No. 
8012 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We vigorously disagree with counsel that "plaiintiffs 
authorized the loaning institution to discharge funds 
from their account directly to Holmes upon presenta-
tion by him of lien waivers from the various laborers and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
material men with whom he was doing business." The 
fact is that the Union Trust Co. was authorized to 
advance the funds to Holmes "to pay bills for labor and 
for materials in the construction of" the Jackson house. 
(See Defendants Exhibit 1). Counsel in said statement 
of fact and his later argument is representing to the 
court that Holmes had the right to draw from the Jack-
son account money to pay any of his laborers or material 
men with whom Holmes was doing business no matter 
which of the many houses Holmes might have worked on 
or furnished materials for. The agreement speaks for 
itself. The labor or materials must have been furnished 
for the Jackson home (Exhibit 1). 
We wish also to add to the facts that there 1s a 
custom in this community whereby holders of money, 
such as was the Union Trust Co., in this case, would pay 
the contractors upon receipt of lien waivers for 1naterials 
and labor furnished for the particular job for which the 
1noney was deposited. The appellants were fa1niliar with 
that custom (R. 14, 31 and 72). With this kno\vledge 
the appel'lants executed and delivered to Hohnes the 
lien waiver in blank, except as to the a1nount and the 
date (R. 33). The appellants left it to Holrnes judgtnent 
to make out and use the lien waiver properly ( R. 35). 
The respondents had left about $9,300.00 with the Union 
Trust Co., to be disbursed according to Exhibit 1 (R. 36). 
Holmes wrongfully inserted the address of the respond-
ents' home that he was building at 1777 11~a~t ~1st ~outh 
Street and used it to get the $700.00 fron1 the rr~pond-
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ents' account at Union Trust Co. when no materials or 
services \\Tere rendered by appellants on that home (R. 
3:2 and 5~). Appellant, H. T. Cope, told respondent, 
\Y. ayne Jackson, \Yhen Jackson went to him to inquire 
specifically if appellants had furnished any materials 
on his house, that they did not furnish any. Ten days 
or t\vo \Yeeks later after appellants had been served 
\\?ith process in this action, H. T. Cope phoned Wayne 
Jackson at his home at 6:30 in the morning and added 
they had delivered some lumber to "Holmes' warehouse 
and that it could have gone anywhere from there" (R. 
39). 
Respondents claim by the action ~f appellants in 
executing the lien waiver in blank, and it being com-
pleted and used ·by Holmes, in a wrongful manner and 
to the loss of respondents in the sum of $700.00 that in 
equity and good conscience appellants should be required 
to reimburse respondents. The district court thought so 
and gave judgment to respondents. 
STATE~fENT OF· POINTS 
POINT I. 
CAN A MATERIAL MAN ISSUE TO A CONTRACTOR 
LIEN WAIVERS SIGNED BY THE MATERIAL MAN IN 
BLANK LEAVING IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO FILL IN 
THE BLANK SPACES AS HE WISHES AND NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE TO AN INJURED PARTY WHER~ THE 
LIEN WAIVERS WERE WRONGFULLY COMPLETED AND 
USED TO OBTAIN MONEY WHICH NEITHER THE CON-
TRACTOR NOR THE MATERIAL MAN WAS ENTITLED TO? 
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ANSWER TO APPE·LLANTS' POINTS I AND II. 
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN FINDINGS 
NO. 6 AND 7 THAT APPELLANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY 
MATERIAL OR SERVICE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
RESPONDENTS' HOME FOR THE $700.00 RECEIVED BY 
APPELLANTS? 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT III. 
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE JUDGMENT IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT IV. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
CAN A MATERIAL MAN ISSUE TO A CONTRACTOR 
LIEN WAIVERS SIGNED BY THE MATERIAL MAN IN 
BLANK LEAVING IT TO THE CONTRACTOR TO FILL IN 
THE BLANK SPACES AS HE WISHES AND NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE TO AN INJURED PARTY WHERE THE 
LIEN WAIVERS WERE WRONGFULLY COMPLETED AND 
USED TO OBTAIN MONEY \VHICH NEITHER THE CON-
TRACTOR NOR THE MATERIAL MAN WAS ENTITLED TO? 
On or about October 27, 1950, the Cope Brothers 
Lumber Co., appeHants, received a $700.00 cheek and n 
blank lien waiver from J. H. IIolmes, (~ontractor. In 
return for that check the lien waiver was signed by 
appellants and the a1nount of $700.00 \VUR plneed thPn)on 
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5 
and the date, and then that lien \vaiver was sent back 
to :J[r. l-Ioln1es, the appellants having full knowledge 
of the fact that ~Ir. Holmes \Vas going to be able to 
collect $700.00 fron1 son1e person's account on the 
strength of that lien waiver. The appellants had no idea 
at all whose account \vas going to be diminished by their 
having ·signed that lien \vaiver, for the person's name 
for whom materials should have been furnished was not 
filled in. It \Vas left in blank by appellants. It seems, 
also, that the contractor, J. H. Holmes, was indebted at 
this time to appellants in the amount of about $3,900.00 
(R. 3-±). In other \vords, the $700.00 received on said 
October :27, 1950 \Vent to appellants to be applied on this 
past indebtedness for materials already furnished to J. 
H. Holmes. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the 
\vhole record that any material was furnished by the 
Cope Brothers Lumber Co. that went into or that was to 
be used in the respond en t''S home. In fact, the evidence 
strongly points the other way. Where is there any show-
ing by appellants that they delivered or furnished any 
1na terial that \vas to be used in the Wayne Jackson 
house~ 
nlr. Cope himself told l\1r. Jackson (R. 38-39) that 
Cope Bros. Lumber Co. had not furnished any material 
for his home, and there is no doubt but what that was 
actually the case. When the $700.00 was received by 
appellants on the strength of the blank lien waiver signed 
by them, the Wayne Jackson home was hardly started, 
being only in the excavation stage (R. 43). Therefore, 
any materials furnished by appellants before this time 
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was no doubt used or to be used on the other jobs of 
Holmes. In other words, there is no evidence of any 
materials furnished by Cope Bros. Lumber Co. for use 
in the Wayne Jackson Home. 
The appellants have cited the case of Bounds vs. 
Nuttle, 30 Atlantic 2nd 263, in their brief at page 18. 
We feel that this case does not apply to the instant case. 
The mechanics lein law as a protection to material1nen 
seems to be the thing in issue there, and deals with an 
ovvner vvho negligently paid money out to a contractor 
and did not see to it that it was applied to the pay1nent 
of the materials going into the building after the materinl 
man had delivered the 1naterials for the particular job. 
In the case at hand, the owner received no materials for 
his job from the material man. The material 1nan n1ust 
at least see to it that the materials for which he i~ paid 
are delivered. 
The respondents in the trial court proved that the 
Cope Brothers Lumber Co. had received some $700.00 
for materials from the account of Wayne Jackson but 
that none of their materials were furnished for the con-
struction of his home. The respondent proved that the 
1naterials which went into their ho1ne came from entirely 
different sources, as was testified to by nf r. Felt of the 
~fill Creek Lumber Co. 1\fr. Felt had 1nade visits, kept 
careful records of deliveries to the '\rayne J arkson job, 
and knew that their materiall-' were being furnished for 
this particular job ( R. 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55). 
The trial rourt, in vie\v of this evidence, \Vas ePr-
tninly ju~tified in holding a~ it did that the ( 10pP Rrothrr~ 
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Lumber Co. did not furnish any n1aterial nor render 
any service for the construction of respondents' home 
at 1777 East 21st South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(R. 7:2). The appellants did not in any way rebut this 
evidence. In fact, the Cope Brothers Lumber Co. had 
no records, data or recollection at all either for materials 
furnished that were used in respondents' home or for 
materials that "'"ere furnished for the use in said home. 
Appellants certainly had some burden there, and they 
failed completely. 
The appellants in their Brief, Point III, place par-
ticular stress on the fact that the judgment is contrary 
to the la,v. This certainly is not the case. The evidence 
clearly shows that there were no materials of Cop,e 
Brothers I_.jumber Co. actually used in the structure of 
respondents, and that there was no delivery of their 
materials to responden,ts' premises for use in their home, 
whether actually used there or not. Appellants have 
referred to a number of citations in their brief dealing 
with the point that a 1naterial man is entitled to a lien 
whether his materials were actually incorporated into 
the structure or not. We should like to emphasize here, 
however, that even these references indicate that the 
materials furnished must have been for a particula,r 
building or improvement. Where is there any evidence 
that appellants furnished any materials for the particu-
lar Wayne Jackson job~ There is none. Is a material 
1nan entitled to a lien on all the properties on which the 
contractor purchaser is doing work when material is 
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obtained by that contractor and the material man does 
not know for what job or for what purpose the n1aterial 
was obtained~ Certainly that could not be the law. The 
inequities that ·would result from such a situation -are 
obvious. Now coming back again to the law, argued in 
appellants' brief, we believe that the question is fully 
answered and discussed in 36 American Juris prudence, 
Sec. 72, page 5-9: 
"There is conflict of authority on the question 
"\vhether a material man is entitled to a lien for 
materials not actually incorporated in to the struc-
ture. Som-e courts have taken the view that under 
mechanics' lien la\vs a material man is not entitled 
to a lien for materials unless they were actually 
used or incorporated into, and became part of the 
structure against which the lien is sought to be 
enf o reed." 
Of course this is the law that respondents contend is the 
proper law to be applied to this case, and there are 
numerous cases to support it. There are other courts, 
however, that have held the opposite vie,v, but there are 
qualifications to be noted under this view. Again quoting 
from 36 American Jurisprudence, Section 7 4, page Gl : 
Even in those jurisdictions in which a lien 
n1ay be acquired for rnaterial furnished although 
it has not actually been incorporated in the build-
ing, structure, or irnprovernen t, it is generally 
held that the lien cannot attach in the absence of 
a delivery of the rnaterial upon the prPtni~P~, or 
other act equivalent then•to, as notice to or an 
irnplierl assent hy the O\\'"ner." 
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In the instant case there 'Yas no such delivery of 
materials upon respondents' premises from the Cope 
Brothers Lumber Co. The only thing that was done by 
appellants eYidently 'vas to credit J. H. ·Holmes account 
$700.00 for past indebtedness. 
Therefore it is our contention that there was no 
right of lien at any time in the Cope Brothers Lumber 
Co. in respect to the Wayne Jackson property. Conse-
quently 'vhen appellants signed said blank lien waiver, 
they 'vere giving no consideration. They were not giving 
up a remedy (a lien right), for they had none. Yet appel-
lants were fully aware that said lien waiver, in essence, 
represented money-some $700.00. The Union Trust 
Company had instructions to only withdraw from the 
vV ayne Jackson account when lien waivers were properly 
filled out. Yes, we believe there was a duty on the part 
of the Cope Brothers Lumber Company to properly fill 
out said lien waiver and to know that they had actually 
furnished materials for the particular job from whenc·e 
the money was coming; this was not done in the instant 
case, and consequently this negligence on the part of 
appellants resulted in respondents' loss. The burden of 
this loss should properly be shifted then to the shoulders 
of the party whose negligence made the loss possible. 
We refer to the case of Imperial Valley Box Co. v. 
Reese (233 P 2nd 629), in which the doctrine is cited 
that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer by 
the act of a third, the one by whose negligence it hap-
pened must be the sufferer." Again from 2 American 
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Jurisprudence, Section 70, page 701, "one delivering an 
instrument in blank is estopped to deny liability." Aside 
from the question of negligence which we feel the trial 
court could also have allowed a recovery on, the respond-
ents believe that said court was fully justified in holding 
as it did on the theory of "Money Had and Received.·· 
We have already noted that this action lies when defend-
ant has obtained money from plaintiff which in equity 
and good conscience should be returned to plaintiff-
How the Cope Brothers Lumber Co. could obtain $700.00 
from the Jacksons in this instance by means of signing 
a blank lien waiver, and having failed to render to then1 
$700.00 worth of service or 1naterials, and still clain1 that 
in equity and good conscience they should not have to 
return said money is beyond our understanding. 
We feel it is a si1nple matter in that the appellants 
have received something for which they have given 
nothing in return when they were under obligation to do 
so, and therefore they ought, in good conscience, to 
return that which they have received. 
Respondents wish to ans\ver the various Points 
argued in appellants' brief as follo\vs: 
ANSWERING POINTS I AND IT. 
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN FINDINGS 
NO.6 AND 7 THAT APPELLANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY 
l\IATERIAL OR SERVICE FOR TilE CONSTRUCTION OF 
RESPONDENTS' HOME FOR TI-IE $700.00 RECEIVED BY 
APPELLANTS? 
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It is admitted in the pre-trial order that appellants 
received the $700.00 on the lien waiver ( R. 31). 
Ample evidence is in the record to sustain the finding 
that no material or services were furnished by app·ellants 
for respondents' home. \\; ayne Jackson testified he knows 
Cope Brothers Lumber Co. did not furnish any lumber in 
his house (R. 37). Jacks~n was told by H. T. Cope on 
tw·o occasions they had no lumber in the house (R. 38 
and 39). The $700.00 which appellants, through Holmes, 
got out of Union Trust Co. from respondents' account 
by reason of the fraudulent lien waiver was money which 
should have been used for valid claims, hence the Jack-
son account at the Union Trust Co. was depleted $700.00 
In equity and good conscience the appeHants should 
return that money. Besides the positive evidence in the 
statement by Mr. Cope to Mr. Jackson that they had no 
lumber in the house, we have the further evidence by 
1\[r. Felt of the ~lillcreek Lumber Co. that it should 
cost between $2500.00 to $3,000.00 in lumber for a com-
pleted house of the size of the Jacksons ( R.. 54). We 
have his testimony also that at the time Holmes left the 
Jackson job the Millcreek Lumber Co. had furnished 
$2,329.96 of the lumber for it (R. 55). Then we have 
Jackson's testimony he spent $1100.00 more on lumber to 
complete this jo'b through a contractor named Harry 
Cook, who bought the lumber from the Sugar House 
Lumber Co. (R. 60 and 61). It appears then that all of 
the lumber that went into the house cost $3,429.96 and 
that from all this evidence was not the court fully justi-
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fied in finding that the appellants did not furnish any 
of the materials for the construction of respondents' 
home~ Through the whole testimony there is not a 
scintilla of evidence that any of appellants' lumber went 
into the Jackson home. 
On page 12 of appellants' brief counsel states that 
Felt of the Millcreek Lumber Co. said it would take 
$2500.00 to $3000.00 in materials to co1nplete while Cope 
said it would be 40% of the total construction. If the 
court will refer to the record, page 54, it will see that 
1fr. Felt was speaking of only the lu1nber while 1\ir. 
Cope was speaking of all material furnished by a lun1ber 
company, except plumbing, brick and wiring. Hard\vare 
and many other items besides lun1ber are furnished by 
lumber companies. So the comparison vvas not a fair 
one. If there was a conflict here the court had a right 
to believe Mr. F'elt, a distinterested party, and to di~­
regard the testimony of Mr. Cope, an interested party. 
ANSWERING POINT III. 
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE JUDGI\IENT IS CON-
TRARY TO LAW. 
We feel that counsel is in error in his points I and II. 
It therefore follo\vs, if that be the case, the court did 
not err in entering its eonelusion of la\v and judgJttPnt. 
We think that our statute on liens has no bearing on the 
issue involved in this case. Appellants pre~~nted no 
evidence that any building Inaterials \VPl'P ~old hy thPnl 
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to Holmes for use in respondents' dwelling. If any 
1naterials had been sold for use in respondents' dwelling 
appellants could have easily proved it by their books but 
no such evidence was offered. Holmes took respondents 
money to pay an old account with appeHants who no 
doubt were pressing him. The only way appellants were 
able to get that $700.00 was the signing of a blank lien 
\vaiver. Had appellants filled out the lien waiver, putting 
the address of some house they had actually sold ma-
terial for they would never have got the $700.00 because 
the circumstances were such that we could fairly assume 
Holmes had drawn down as much as he could on those 
accounts and in order to try to keep his head above 
water, he had to dip into the newer accounts. The blank 
lien waiver of appellants made it convenient for Holmes 
to do that. When they gave Holmes the lien waiver 
signed in blank, they by such action gave him authority 
to fill in the blank spaces for them. Hence, in that 
respect, he \Vas their agent. 
We do not agree with counsel that Holmes was 
respondents' agent. He was an independent contractor. 
(Rigney v. DeLaSalle Institution, 52 P 2nd 579 Calif.). 
Holmes had a written contract to fulfill with respondents. 
He was not authorized in any respect to act for them. 
On the other hand, he was an agent of appellants in 
respect to the lien waiver. "Agency is created when one 
is authorized by another to act in some respect for him." 
\; ol 2, Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., p. 717. He was 
authorized by them to fill out the blanks in the lien 
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waiver. As their agent, he wrongfully made it out and 
was able to get money of innocent parties. 
By Holmes and appellants executing the lien waiver 
In question, the appellants did not give up any right 
as counsel con tends. They had no lien right as against 
respondents' property, so they could not give up a right. 
As to negligence, of course, we claim appellants 
were negligent when they placed in the hands of Hohnes 
a lien waiver signed in blank by which he was enabled to 
defraud innocent parties. "Negligence is any conduct ... 
which falls below the standard established by law· for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm." Vol. 28, Words and Phrases, Perm Ed, p. 336. 
The fact that negligence is involved does not mean that 
recovery cannot be had on grounds of 1noney had and 
received or even on both grounds. 
"Action for money had and received is equit-
able in nature, and lies to recover 1noney in hands 
of defendant which in equity and good conscience 
belongs to plaintiff." 'l ol. 27, Words and PhraSP:-\~ 
Perm. Ed., page 478. 
ANSWERIN·G POINT J\T. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN Al\IENDING THE 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
This same question was discussed and decided hy 
this court in Reich et ux, v. ChristoJntlos, et al., on April 
16, 19'53, at 256 P. 2d page 238 ______ Utah ------· Thr court 
held that the atnendinent \Va~ not an error nnd on pn.~.!Y 
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2-!1 said: ''The amendment made was equivalent to an 
a1nendmen t to conform to the evidence. The trial court 
did that which \Yas necessary and proper to effectuate 
justice." The same question being involved in this case, 
\Ye see no reason to discuss it further. 
CON·CLUSION 
The respondents respectfully submit that the view 
held by the trial court is the proper one and that the 
appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed with cost to respond-
ents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG & YOUNG, 
1003-08 Boston Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
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